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ARGUMENT 
James Brockbank submits this Answer Brief in response to Penny Brockbank's 
cross appeal. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its valuation of "Brockbank 
Appraisal Service" (hereafter BAS). Penny Brockbank is not entitled to attorney fees on 
appeal. 
L PENNY BROCKBANK'S FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE REGARDING GOODWILL, REPUTATION, 
AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSE SHOULD PRECLUDE 
HER FROM CHALLENGING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING 
ON APPEAL. 
Penny Brockbank should be prevented from challenging the trial court's findings 
on appeal because she failed to marshal the evidence. "In order to challenge a trial 
court's finding of fact on Appeal, the challenger must marshal all the evidence in support 
of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings in question." Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App. 
1996)(citations omitted). Penny Brockbank did not marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's finding. She failed to marshal the evidence presented in David R. 
Anderson's report regarding goodwill and reputation (Mr. Anderson's conclusions 
regarding goodwill and reputation are listed in argument II) . Penny Brockbank only 
restated the portions of Mr. Anderson's testimony and report which she believed 
supported her position, but ignored the portions which supported the court's findings. 
The Court of Appeals has stated that when a party fails to marshal the evidence, the trial 
court's findings will not be disturbed on appeal. Marshall at 516. Therefore, the finding 
1 
that only BAS's fixed assets were subject to marital division should stand on appeal. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN VALUING BROCKBANK APPRAISAL SERVICE (BAS) 
BECAUSE THE GOODWILL, REPUTATION, AND 
PROFESSIONAL LICENSE OF JAMES BROCKBANK IS 
NOT A MARITAL ASSET SUBJECT TO DIVISION. 
Penny Brockbank argued that the trial court abused its discretion in valuing BAS 
at $17,115. (Appellee's Brief 23-27.) Penny Brockbank argued that the entire fair 
market value of BAS was subject to marital division, rather than only the $17,115 value 
of BAS's fixed assets. (Appellee's Brief 23-27.) James Brockbank disagrees. The 
goodwill, reputation, and professional license of James Brockbank is not a marital asset 
subject to division. 
The evidence at trial showed that except for BAS's fixed assets, the value of BAS 
was dependent upon the goodwill, reputation and professional license of James 
Brockbank. The only evidence regarding the valuation of BAS was the testimony and 
report (Exhibit 14) of David R. Anderson. In his report, David R. Anderson made several 
significant conclusions: 
The business [BAS] is dependent on the personal services of Mr. 
James Brockbank who is licensed by the State of Utah and has 
received various professional certifications appropriate to the 
recognition of his experience and education in the residential and 
commercial real estate fields. (Exhibit 14-page l)(emphasis added.) 
While Mr. Brockbank has employed various individuals to assist 
with assorted functions of the appraisal process, his personal review 
and interface is critical with each appraisal job the business 
2 
undertakes. The personal role Mr. Brockbank plays in the 
completion of each appraisal is essential in determining the ultimate 
marketability of the business. (Exhibit 14-page l)(emphasis added.) 
A service business generally does not require a relatively significant 
investment in capital assets. The assets are generally restricted to 
office furniture and fixtures, vehicles, electronic equipment and 
office facilities. (Exhibit 14-page l)(emphasis added.) 
Mr. James Brockbank has developed the current business [BASJ into 
what it is today by his personal involvement. His personal 
reputation in the industry, his business contacts, his established 
relationships with lenders and the real estate industry have led to the 
success the business enjoys today. (Exhibit 14—page 2)(emphasis 
added.) 
In addition to his report, David R. Anderson's testimony at trial also provided 
significant information about BAS and James Brockbank. When asked during redirect 
examination whether the value of BAS was dependent entirely on James Brockbank's 
reputation, David R. Anderson answered that the value of BAS was "significantly" 
dependent upon James Brockbank's reputation. (R. at 313-page 155.) Penny Brockbank 
argued that David R. Anderson had a limited ability to evaluate goodwill. However, 
when David Anderson was asked whether he had moved beyond his ability, he answered 
"we are still in the realm of what my opinion is regarding Mr. Brockbank's role in 
determining fair market value . . . . " (R. at 313—page 155.) 
The law regarding the division of goodwill and reputation is clear. "[Ujnless the 
professional retires and his practice is sold, his reputation should not be treated 
differently from a professional degree or an advanced degree . . . .We held in 
Gardner... that advanced degrees were not marital property which could be valued and 
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then divided between the spouses. The reputation of a sole practitioner is personal, as is 
a professional degree." Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774, 776 (Utah 1992)(citing 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988)). "It would not be equitable to 
[divide] the value ascribed to the goodwill, because the goodwill of a sole practitioner is 
nothing more than his or her reputation for competency...." Sorensen at 775. 
In this case, James Brockbank is not selling BAS. Therefore, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it refused to divide the assets of BAS that were dependent upon 
James Brockbank's goodwill and reputation. 
Penny Brockbank argued that James Brockbank5 s appraiser licence was not a 
"professional license" or an "advanced degree." Penny Brockbank argued that only 
medical doctors, lawyers or advanced degrees such as an MBA rise to the level of 
professional license or advanced degree. (Appellee's Brief 27.) However, the law does 
not support this proposition. In fact, even the case Penny Brockbank cites as authority for 
her argument does not support her proposition. Penny Brockbank cited to Peterson v. 
Peterson, 131 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987). Peterson states: 
[A]n advanced degree is or confers an intangible right which, 
because of its character, cannot properly be characterized as property 
subject to division between the spouses. Id at 241. 
Property can be bought, sold, and devised. Bona fide degrees 
cannot be bought sold and devised. Bona fide degrees cannot be 
bought; they are earned. They cannot be sold; they are personal to 
the named recipient. Upon the death of the named recipient, the 
certificate commemorating award of the degree might be passed 
along and treasured as a family heirloom, but the recipient may not, 
on the strength of that degree, practice law or medicine. Id at 240. 
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An appraiser license cannot be bought or sold. An appraiser license cannot be 
devised. Only James Brockbank can perform appraisals on the strength of his license. 
Therefore, James Brockbank's appraisal license is a bona fide license which cannot be 
divided. 
Penny Brockbank also stated that to become a "registered appraiser" only two 
weeks of state schooling was required. (Brief of Appellee 27.) Apparently, Penny 
Brockbank made this statement to imply that the ease of obtaining a registered appraiser 
license removes it from the status of a "professional license" or "advanced degree." 
However, this argument is irrelevant because James Brockbank is a "certified" appraiser. 
"The process of certification is much more lengthy [than the process to become 
registered]." (R. at 314-page 57-58.) It requires additional schooling, requires obtaining 
a minimum number of points from performing many appraisals, and must be renewed 
every two years. (R. at 314—page 57-58.) James Brockbank has spent a substantial 
amount of time earning and renewing his certified appraiser licence. 
The law regarding "professional license" and "advanced degree" is clear. "The 
recipient of an advanced degree obtains that degree on the basis of his or her innate 
personal talents, capabilities, and acquired skills and knowledge." Martinez v. Martinez^ 
818 P.2d 538, 541 (Utah 1991). "The time has long passed when a person's personal 
attributes and talents were thought to be subject to monetary valuation In short, we 
do not recognize a property interest in personal characteristics of another person such as 
5 
intelligence, skill, judgment and temperament, however characterized." Martinez at 542. 
Penny Brockbank gives the impression that if the entire fair market value of BAS 
is not equally divided, James Brockbank will receive an unmerited bounty. However, this 
is not true. Penny Brockbank is already receiving an equitable share of BAS's fair market 
value. The income that James Brockbank receives because of his reputation, goodwill, 
and professional license is already shared with Penny Brockbank in the form of alimony 
and child support. Subjecting James Brockbank's goodwill, reputation, and professional 
license to division would result in double counting for Penny Brockbank. See Sorensen 
at 776. 
m. PENNY BROCKBANK IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY 
FEES ON APPEAL. 
Penny Brockbank is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. Although Penny 
Brockbank asserted that she was entitled to an award of attorney fees concerning this 
appeal, she failed to state a reason. (Appellee's Brief 28.) Because Penny Brockbank has 
failed to state a reason why the Court of Appeals should remand the case to assess 
attorney fees concerning this appeal, Penny Brockbank's request should be denied. 
6 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the forgoing reasons, the Court of Appeals should affirm the trial 
court's decision regarding the valuation of BAS and should deny Penny Brockbank's 
unsupported claim for attomey fees. The Court of Appeals should reverse the trial 
court's findings regarding James Brockbank's income for purposes of temporary debt 
support and permanent support for the reasons stated in Appellant's Brief. 
Dated this / day of October, 1998. 
BRENT D. YOl^ SfG (j 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this 7 day of October, 1998,1 caused to be mailed, 
first-class mail, postage prepaid, the foregoing Answer Brief of Appellant to John E. 
Schindler, Attorney for Penny Brockbank, at the following address: 
John E. Schindler 
80 West Main, Suite 201 
Price, Utah 84501 
BRENT D. Yi 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Exhibit 14—David R. Anderson's Report. 
B. Testimony of David R. Anderson. 
C. Testimony regarding "appraiser certification." 
D. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992). 
E. Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 1991). 
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Sr 
David R. Anderson 
Certified Public Accountant (801) 637-9218 
Personal Financial Specialist 296 East 100 South 
P.O. Box 4 
Price, Utah 84501 
February 15, 1996 
Mr Brent D. Young 
Attorney at Law 
P O Box 657 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Re: Brockbank Appraisal Services 
Dear Mr Young. 
Based on our earlier conversations and your letter dated January 9, 1996,1 have evaluated 
the appraisal business of Mr. James Brockbank know as "Brockbank Appraisal Services". 
The evaluation of this business has been particularly difficult due to the lack of 
accounting/ record keeping procedures and journals and the lack of appropriate 
documentation. In addition, significant time delays have occurred between the time 
various items were requested and the delivery of the requested items. This should not be 
construed that Mr. Brockbank was not cooperative, Mr. Brockbank was very cooperative. 
It seemed, however that Mr. Brockbank simply did not have possession of or access to 
many financial documents. 
Upon you approval and release, I will forward copies of the enclosed report to Mr. 
Schindler. 
Upon your review of the enclosed, please feel free to contact me at any time if you require 
additional clarification. 
Sincerely, 
David R. Anderson, CPA 
DRA/ka 
enc. 
cc: Mr. James Brockbank 
A-\ 
MEMBER: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Personal Financial Planning Division (AICPA), Utah Association of Certified Public Accountants 
BROCKBANK APPRAISAL SERVICE 
February 15, 1996 
1 - Mr. James Brockbank operates a sole proprietorship in the Carbon and Emery county 
area of Utah known as Brockbank Appraisal Service. The business was formerly know as 
Brockbank & Associates. The change in name occurred for reasons unrelated to the 
operation of the business and the principal, Mr. James Brockbank has not changed. The 
change in name did not and does not effect the value of the business. 
Mr. Brockbank has operated the business in the referenced area in excess of 15 years 
and the business is well established and well known throughout the area of operation. The 
business provides real estate appraisal services to the general public throughout the area 
with a primary concentration on residential real estate appraisal services. A significant 
amount of income is derived from providing commercial real estate appraisal services. A 
small portion of income is derived from miscellaneous ancillary services generally 
associated with residential or commercial real estate valuation services. 
2 - The business is dependent on the personal services of Mr. James Brockbank who is 
licensed by the State of Utah and has received various professional certifications 
appropriate to the recognition of his experience and education in the residential and 
commercial real estate fields. 
While Mr. Brockbank has employed various individuals to assist with assorted 
functions of the appraisal process, his personal review and interface is critical with each 
appraisal job the business undertakes. The personal role Mr. Brockbank plays in the 
completion of each appraisal is essential in determining the ultimate marketability of the 
business. 
3 - The business is a service business which operates differently from a retail/resale or 
manufacturing business. The income is primarily derived from the personal services of one 
or more individuals which generate a product which is generally of an informational nature 
and not consumable. 
The principal items which separate a service business from other types of businesses 
are the lack of capital investment and the necessity of direct involvement of personnel in 
the finished product. Business affiliations, reputation and training of principals and staff 
are significant factors. A service business generally does not require a relatively significant 
investment in capital assets. The assets are generally restricted to office furniture and 
fixtures, vehicles, electronic equipment and office facilities. 
-1-
A - GROSS SALES / INCOME 
Service businesses are generally transferred to a new owner in a complete (100%) 
sale, at a value based on a number of factors. One factor that always an issue is the 
concept of "Gross Sales". A simple formula may be 100% of annual gross sales plus 
assets. This formula is fairly typical and consistent. 
As a going concern, the business being transferred generates income based on the 
past efforts of the previous owners. Prior owners have established business contacts, 
community presence, established quality perceptions, acquired resources, staff, equipment 
and facilities in a such a configuration as to promote continued success. 
The variable which is the most difficult to determine is the effect the previous owner 
has on a business as a continuing operation. When the principal who has developed, 
molded and shaped the business into its current identity departs, the void left on the 
continued operation is very real but extremely difficult to measure. 
Mr. James Brockbank has developed the current business into what it is today by his 
personal involvement. His personal reputation in the industry, his business contacts, his" 
established relationships with lenders and the real estate industry have led to the success-
the business enjoys today. 
Should the current business be transferred without the continued involvement of Mr. 
Brockbank, the marketability of the business is greatly reduced. New owners would be 
required to establish their own individual identity and reputation in the appraisal 
community. Obviously, some continued income would flow to the new owners based on 
the established influence of Mr. Brockbank but would certainly diminish with time. The 
income generated by the new owners would quickly be replaced with income based solely 
on their individual business identity with the effect of Mr. Brockbank diminishing rapidly. 
During the previous four years, Mr. Brockbank has enjoyed an arrangement with the 
Carbon County Assessor's office to provide appraisal services to the County. During the 
years 1992 through 1995, the County arrangement generated gross income in the amounts 
of 530,098, $36,227, 541,104 and 523,263 respectively. The income for the year 1995 
was generated for a period of approximately 6 months at which time the assessor's office 
terminated the program, which in turn eliminated this source of income. 
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A-1 
The gross income (sales) of the business for the years 1994 and 1995 are as follows: 
12M 1295 
Gross Income 5154,596 $135,668 
Less- Carbon County Income ( 41.104) ( 28.263) 
Adjust Gross Income SI 13,492 $107,405 
Average Gross Income Sl^Q.449 
When examining the preceding discussion of Mr. Brockbank's personal involvement 
in the generation of gross income and continued success of the business, the geographic 
location of the business must be considered. The Carbon/Emery County area has 
historically been isolated to a limited degree from the economic events, both up and down, 
of the populous areas of Utah. The market has continued to support only_two fiill time 
appraisal business^operations. Tne inability of this market to expand significantly is 
bw - jorted by the lack of other appraisal businesses operating in this area on a full time 
basis. Part time operations and occasional outside services have always shared the market 
but continue to be a relatively insignificant competitive concern. 
The combination of personal involvement by Mr. Brockbank and the geographic 
market restrictions dictate a deep discounting in the evaluation of this type of business. 
With the assumption that gross income is the basis for determining market value, it follows 
that the gross income as a basis must be discounted for known restrictions on 
marketability. 
The amount of discount to apply to gross income for the purposes of determining 
market value is at best an arbitrary effort. However, alternative information can provide 
an insight into the discount rate. In the past few years, including 1995, closely held 
business in the Carbon/Emery area which are being valued (fair market value) for estate 
tax purposes receive discounts due the lack of marketability, lack of ease of transfer, role 
the principal and founding owners have played, geographic conditions and general local 
market economic conditions. The discount for estate tax purposes has been applied at 25 
to 30 percent of the established market value. This discount has routinely been accepted 
by the Internal Revenue Service indicating acceptance of the discount for fair market value 
purposes. 
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The conclusions which can be drawn from the preceding discussion would dictate a 
discount is in order in this situation. 
Average Gross Income (as adjusted) S110,449 
Discount 25% ( 27.612) 
Discounted Average Gross Income S 82,837 
The assets used and owned by the business are relatively insignificant and the fair 
market value is assumed by Mr. Brockbank to be as follows: 
Equipment including 
new computer equipment $ 15,290 
Office furniture and fixtures 1,775 
Supplies 50. 
Total S17.115 
The FAIR MARKET VALUE of BROCKBANK APPRAISAL SERVICES is 
estimated as follows: 
Average Gross Sales $110,449 
Marketability Discount ( 27,612) 
Assets 17115 
Fair Market Value S 99.952 
(Gross Sales Approach) 
B - BENEFITS TO OWNERS 
An alternative approach of determining the fair market value of a business is to 
determine the benefits to new owners. This approach, called the buyer's approach, 
measures the benefits the business will provide to the new owner. Non cash benefits such 
as personal expenses paid directly by the business and cash benefits received must be 
combined and valued. 
X-5 
Using the analysis from the gross sales discussion, the conclusion is drawn that the 
benefits to the new owners from the efforts of the prior owner will continue to generate 
benefits to the new owner over the short term with quickly diminishing returns. The 
generally accepted perception is that by the end of the second year after a transfer of 
ownership, the benefits derived by the new owners will be generated by their own efforts 
and not by the prior management. 
The non cash benefits of the business have not been determined. The records of the 
business do not provide reliable documentation which will enable the non cash benefits to 
be measured. The draws or cash with drawn by Mr. Brockbank for his personal accounts 
for the years 1994 and 1995 are as follows: 
Personal Draws 
Carbon County Income 
12M 
$60,533 
( 41,104^ 
1221 
$79,881 
(28.2<?3) 
Net Draws S19,429 551,618 
Average Draws (adjusted) 535,524 
Average Draws recoverable 
for a 2 year period 571.048 
The personal draws of Mr. Brockbank have been reduced by the amount of the 
Carbon County income during the periods 1994 and 1995. The Carbon County draws, 
while being available and used by the owner either in the business or personally, are not 
applicable to new owners. Since the arrangement with Carbon County has terminated, the 
Carbon County income would not be a reasonable inclusion in the amount future owners 
could expect to receive from the income generated by the prior efforts of the previous 
owner. It is assumed the benefits to the new owner from the prior owners efforts would 
continue for a maximum of two years. At the end of two years the lasting benefits to the 
new owners would be extinguished. 
Since the previous section on assets of the business has been discussed, the amount 
would properly be included in the value of the business. 
Average Draws for 
a two year period 571,048 
Assets ' 17r115 
Fair Market Value 
(Owner1 Benefit Approach) S88T163 
-5-
A'b 
C - CONCLUSION 
Based on the two approaches discussed and analysis involved, the fair market value of 
Brockbank Appraisal Service is determined as follows: 
Gross Income Approach $99,952 
Benefit to Owner Approach 88T163 
Average 594,058 
FAIR MARKET VALUE S94.058 
D - CONDITIONS 
1 - Records: The records, journals and source documents of Brockbank Appraisal were 
incomplete and commingled. Bank statements for the year 1994 were not available for the 
three business accounts. The exception was the account at Carbon Credit Union which 
Mr. Brockbank was able to obtain a transcript from Carbon Credit Union. The checkbook 
registers were not footed but each entry has sufficient notation to draw conclusions 
regarding the purpose of the disbursement. The Carbon Credit Union account did not 
have a checkbook register but carbon copies of the checks were made available. Numbers 
were missing on the Carbon Credit Union account providing an in complete checkbook 
history The complete transcript of the Carbon Credit Union account enabled the carbon 
copies and transcript combination to become a reliable source document. Every effort 
was made to be complete and accurate in this evaluation. 
2 - Income records: The income records of the company are maintained in a log which 
appeared to be complete. The actual deposit record were not complete due to the factors 
indicated in 1, above. The income log detailed each job, the job date, the job file 
reference, the client, the property, the date the invoice was sent and the date the invoice 
was paid. This record appeared to provide a great deal of accuracy with respect to the 
income of the business. 
3 - Assets: Assets of the business were not inspected, a summary of the assets was 
provided by Mr. Brockbank with his estimate of the fair market value. The values 
indicated appeared to be reasonable but no attempt was made to verify the values 
provided. 
4 - Cooperation: Mr. Brockbank was very cooperative but unable to obtain many records 
requested. When possible, Mr. Brockbank obtained additional or supplemental 
documentation from sources available. 
-6-
y 4 - * 
5 - Tax Returns: For the year 1994 and prior, the tax returns for the business were 
included in the personal return of Mr. & Mrs. Brockbank by virtue of schedule C attached 
to and incorporated into the personal income tax return. Any information extracted from 
the 1994 income tax returns which were prepared by the accounting firm of Smuin and 
Rich, CPA's was assumed to be correct and accurate. 
6 - Audit: No attempt was made to audit, review or compile any financial information of 
the business in accordance with standards prescribed by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants. This report must not be construed as representation of operating 
results and should not be used by any parties not familiar with the inherent limitations of 
this type of analysis. No opinion on the operating results of Brockbank Appraisal Services 
is offer or intended. The financial information presented is the representation of the 
owners of Brockbank Appraisal Service. 
David R. Anderson 
Certified Public Accountant 
Price, Utah 
February 15, 1996 
-7-
A -? 
154 
Q. If you were to learn today that he has 
another appraiser in h i s employ, and we assume then 
t h a t they perform the same function of an appra iser , 
does that change your statement t ha t you write down 
here af te r paragraph 2 - - or paragraph marked 2 on 
page 1, that i t ' s dependent on the personal services 
of Mr. Brockbank? 
A. No, I don't th ink so. 
Q. So are you telling me, then, if he has 10 
appraisers and they all do the work, and he simply 
signs off on them because he has reviewed them all, 
and he is the one that goes to the banks and talks 
them into referring their business to him, and goes to 
the various areas where his business may have some 
influence or value, and sells his business to them, 
and they refer their business to him and somebody else 
does the work, that doesn't change your opinion about 
that sentence? 
A. I think your example is outside the relevant 
range. I think if he had 10 appraisers I would want 
to qualify my statement, but if I were to learn that 
he had another certified appraiser working under his 
(inaudible) it would not change my opinion. 
Q. About value. 
A. About value. 
B-i 
155 
Q. But i t may change your opinion about t h a t 
sentence, would i t not? 
A. I t h ink so. 
Q. So what you're t e l l i n g us , then, i s t h a t the 
value of Brockbank Appraisal, in your view, i s 
dependent e n t i r e l y on Mr. Brockbank's reputat ion 
period? 
A. No, s i gn i f i can t ly , not e n t i r e l y . 
Q. The difference between s ign i f i c an t l y and 
e n t i r e l y , then, i s that there may be somebody e l s e who 
i s a qua l i f ied appraiser with the same licenses t h a t 
he has, same qua l i f i c a t i ons that he has, doing some of 
t h a t work, producing some of that gross income; i s 
t h a t r ight? 
A. I d o n ' t think I can give t h a t a yes or no 
answer. I t h ink I would have to answer that - - I 
c a n ' t answer t h a t . I'm not - -
Q. Have we not, Dave, at t h i s point moved in to 
the realm t h a t you feel may be beyond your capab i l i t y 
(inaudible) an appraiser as opposed t o a CPA looking 
a t records? 
A. I d o n ' t think so, I think we are s t i l l i n 
the realm of what my opinion i s regarding Mr. 
Brockbank's r o l e in determining f a i r market value, as 
I understand h i s business . 
B-Z 
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Q. Well, his role is in the area of goodwill, 
and that, you've already acknowledged, has a value if 
we're appraising a business; is that a fair statement? 
A. That is a fair statement. 
Q. The value of the business known as Brockbank 
Appraisals, then, if Mr. Brockbank were to vanish 
today, and the product continued to be churned out in 
the same regularity that it was in 1995, then your 
opinion of the value of Brockbank Appraisals would be 
the same; is that right? 
In other words, what I'm saying is the value 
of Brockbank Appraisal is dependent on the work that 
comes into the business, and what you're telling me is 
that in your view, that comes -- the business comes in 
simply because it's Brockbank Appraisals; isn't that 
right? 
A. To a significantly degree, yes. 
Q. So if the business, whatever name was 
operating under, produced revenue at the amounts 
indicated here, your opinion about the value of that 
business would be the same, right? 
A. Given the existing configuration of 
personnel and involvement of the same staff as it is 
in the report, yes. 
Q. So your figures, then, have nothing to do 
B-3 
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employment? 
A. She has other employment, yes. 
Q. And then she -- I assume it's a she? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She works for you when you need her to do 
things? 
A. Yes. If I have say two appraisals that a 
couple of lenders need or want done quickly or at the 
same time, then I would use her -- that sort of thing. 
Q. And she is licensed to conduct appraisals; 
is that correct? 
A. She's a registered appraiser. 
Q. What does it take to be registered? 
A. Two weeks of -- I think it's two weeks of 
state -- schooling approved by the state, submission 
of an application. It's a very simple process to 
become registered. 
Q. Is there a process called certification, or 
what's the next step up? 
A. The process of certification is much more 
lengthy. It requires additional schooling, it 
requires doing (inaudible) they call it attaining 
points, you get so many points for certain kinds of 
appraisals. You are allowed a maximum number -- you 
may do -- say the points that the state sets are 25 
C-l 
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points per month, and you do 50, you're only given the 
25 points. The 50 is not carried over to the next 
month. 
Q. Is there a certificate or something that you 
get? 
A. At the end of this more or less 
apprenticeship period, is really what it is, you are 
required to take an examination. 
Q. Is it a state license thing? 
A. It is a state licensing exam, yes. 
Q. And you have to take this exam and obviously 
pass? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Does i t require a yearly renewal? 
A. I be l ieve i t ' s renewed every two years . 
Q. To get on the l i s t that Ms. Mower spoke of 
t h a t you have t o be cer t i f i ed? What's your 
understanding? 
A. Registered appraisers can - - i f r eg i s te red 
appraisers do appraisa ls tha t the lender or the 
underwriter f e e l s i s professional work, then they wi l l 
signings by the ce r t i f i ed appraiser . They wi l l not 
accept the r eg i s t e r ed appra i se r ' s appraisa l unless the 
c e r t i f i e d appra i se r signs on i t . 
C-2 
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Elaine S. SORENSEN, Plaintiff, 
Respondent, and Cross-
Petitioner, 
v. 
Clifford G. SORENSEN, Defendant, 
Petitioner, and Cross-
Respondent 
No. 890145. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 30, 1992. 
Rehearing Denied July 7, 1992. 
Wife sued for divorce. The Second 
District Court, Davis County, Rodney S. 
Page, J., granted a divorce, divided marital 
property, and awarded the wife attorney 
fees. Husband appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, 769 P.2d 820, affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. Petition and cross peti-
tion for certiorari were granted. The Su-
preme Court, Howe, A.C.J., held that (1) 
goodwill and reputation in the husband's 
solo dental practice was not a marital asset 
subject to equitable division where the hus-
band continued his practice at the same 
location after the divorce; (2) accounts re-
ceivable of the husband's practice were a 
marital asset, but the husband was entitled 
to an offset for accounts payable against 
value of the receivables; (3) a stipulation 
between the parties supported an order di-
recting each party to pay half the fees of a 
mutually acceptable appraiser, even if the 
husband was obligated to pay more than 
the statutory expert witness fee; and (4) 
the evidence supported the award of attor-
ney fees to the wife. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Stewart, J., concurred with opinion. 
Durham, J., dissented in part with 
opinion, in which Zimmerman, J., joined. 
1. Divorce <*=>252.3(1) 
Goodwill and reputation of husband's 
solo dental practice was not marital asset 
subject to equitable division where husband 
continued in his practice at same location 
after divorce; husband did not retire or sell 
O-l 
his practice and, thus, did not realize any 
amount over and above tangible assets of 
his dental practice. 
2. Divorce <s=*253(3) 
Accounts receivable of husband's solo 
dental practice could be included in value of 
practice, for purposes of division of marital 
property, even though proceeds represent-
ed deferred income from which husband 
could pay child support and alimony; dis-
counted value of accounts receivable were 
includable as marital asset. 
3. Divorce <s=>253(3) 
In establishing value of accounts re-
ceivable of husband's solo dental practice, 
for purposes of division of marital assets, 
husband was entitled to offset accounts 
payable against accounts receivable. 
4. Divorce <3=>227(1) 
Stipulation under which parties agreed 
to have their real property appraised by 
mutually acceptable appraiser permitted 
trial court to require parties to share equal-
ly in payment of appraiser's fees, even if 
amount for which husband was held liable 
exceeded statutory witness fees; stipula-
tion contemplated that trial court would 
determine who was to pay for appraisal 
based on equitable considerations. U.C.A. 
1953, 21-5-4. 
5. Divorce <£=>227(1) 
Evidence was sufficient to support 
award of $2,000 in attorney fees to wife, 
representing one-half of requested fees; al-
though husband's attorney refused to stip-
ulate to reasonableness of requested fees, 
stipulation indicated that wife's attorney, if 
called, would testify that requested fees 
were reasonable. 
Kent M. Kasting, John D. Sheaffer, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant 
Reid E. Lewis, Jeffrey Robinson, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff. 
ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice. 
We granted defendant's petition for cer-
tiorari to review a decision of the court of 
SORENSEN i 
Cite** 839 P.2d 
appeals that affirmed the trial court's (1) 
valuation and distribution of defendant's 
dental practice and (2) allocation of expert 
witness fees between plaintiff and defen-
dant in this divorce action. Sorensen v. 
Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah CLApp.1989). 
We also granted plaintiffs cross-petition in 
which she assails the court of appeals' (1) 
reversal of the trial court's award of attor-
ney fees to her and (2) denial of attorney 
fees to her on appeal. 
Plaintiff Elaine S. Sorensen and defen-
dant Clifford G. Sorensen were married in 
April 1975. Plaintiff sued for divorce in 
March 1985. Four children had been born 
to the parties, one of whom died after the 
divorce decree was entered. The trial 
court awarded custody of the children to 
plaintiff and ordered defendant to pay child 
support and alimony. As part of the prop-
erty division, the court awarded defendant 
his dental practice. In valuing that prac-
tice, the court found that "the large portion 
of the value of the practice has to do with 
goodwill and reputation built up in the 
practice over the years of marriage." The 
court relied on the opinion of plaintiffs 
appraiser in arriving at a value of the prac-
tice. Other property of equal value was 
awarded to plaintiff. Defendant was or-
dered to pay $2,000 toward plaintiffs attor-
ney fees and one-half the fees of a real 
estate appraiser selected by the parties. 
Defendant appealed to the court of ap-
peals. His principal contention was that 
the trial court should not have included 
goodwill and reputation in its valuation of 
his dental practice. After reviewing the 
cases and authorities on the subject, the 
court of appeals affirmed the valuation and 
affirmed the allocation of payment of the 
expert's appraisal fees but reversed the 
tnai court's award of $2,000 attorney fees 
to plaintiff. She was also denied attorney 
fees on appeal. 
I. VALUATION OF DENTAL 
PRACTICE 
A. Goodwill and Reputation 
[11 Defendant renews his objection to 
the inclusion of goodwill in valuing his den-
tal practice. The trial court valued the 
. SORENSEN Utah 775 
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practice at $100,060, $62,560 of which rep-
resented the value of goodwill which de-
pended upon defendant's retiring from his 
practice and referring his patients to the 
buyer. The balance consisted of furniture 
and equipment ($15,330) and discounted ac-
counts receivable ($22,170). In its findings 
of fact, the trial court implicitly recognized 
that the goodwill and reputation of Dr. 
Sorensen were bound up together. In find-
ing of fact No. 7, the court stated: 
The defendant should be awarded the 
dental practice including all equipment 
and accounts receivable^] the Court feel-
ing that the large portion of the value of 
the practice has to do with goodwill and 
reputation built up in the practice over 
the years of marriage. 
(Emphasis added.) In affirming the inclu-
sion of goodwill, the court of appeals relied 
on what it stated to be the rule in a majori-
ty of jurisdictions and also on dicta which it 
found in our decision in Gardner v. Gard-
ner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988). 
However, in Gardner there were twenty-
three physicians in the Ogden Clinic. The 
goodwill of the clinic did not rest on the 
reputation of any one person as it does in 
the case of a sole practitioner such as de-
fendant In a clinic, practitioners may 
come and go and the institution may have 
goodwill separate and apart from any one 
practitioner. 
It may well be that if the sole practition-
er retires at the time of a divorce and his or 
her practice is actually sold and an amount 
is realized over and above the value of the 
tangible assets, the full amount should be 
viewed as marital property. We leave that 
issue for another day. In the instant case, 
however, no actual sale took place, and 
defendant continued in his practice ac the 
same location following the divorce. It 
would not be equitable to require him to 
pay his wife part of the value ascribed to 
the goodwill, because the goodwill of a sole 
practitioner is nothing more than his or her 
reputation for competency, as pointed out 
in the dissenting opinion of Judge Jackson 
in the court of appeals. Sorensen, 769 
P.2d at 833; see also Prahinski v. Prahin-
ski, 321 Md. 227, 582 A.2d 784 (1990). We 
D-2. 
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recognize that a professional reputation 
can be valued and that it sometimes can be 
sold together with the tangible assets of a 
practice when the professional retires. We 
believe, however, that unless the profes-
sional retires and his practice is sold, his 
reputation should not be treated differently 
from a professional degree or an advanced 
degree: both simply enhance the earning 
ability of the holder. 
We held in Gardner and more recently in 
Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538 (Utah 
1991), that advanced degrees were not mar-
ital property which could be valued and 
then divided between the spouses. The 
reputation of a sole practitioner is personal, 
as is a professional degree. Both enhance 
the professional's earning capacity. The 
combination of the degree and the practi-
tioner's reputation enables him or her to 
earn in many cases a substantial income, 
the fruits of which are shared by the chil-
dren in the form of child support and by 
the former spouse in the form of alimony. 
That is true in the instant case where de-
fendant has been ordered to pay substan-
tial amounts of child support and alimony 
which were determined in light of his earn-
ings from his dental practice. Requiring 
defendant to divide with his wife the value 
of his reputation would not be an "equita-
ble division/' which is required by our stat-
ute, but would constitute "double count-
ing," which is condemned in property divi-
sion cases. See Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 
Wis.2d 327, 352, 309 N.W.2d 343, 355 (Ct 
App.1981); In re Marriage of Nichols, 43 
ColoApp. 383, 386, 606 P.2d 1314, 1316 
(Ct.App.1979) (Ruland, J., concurring). 
In affirming the trial court's inclusion of 
goodwill and reputation in the valuation of 
the dental practice, the court of appeals 
warned: 
We emphasize, however, one factor 
that clearly should not be considered in 
the valuation of goodwill is the profes-
sional spouse's future earning capacity. 
Consistent with our position that profes-
sional degrees are not assets capable of 
distribution, we similarly hold that the 
future earning capacity of the divorcing 
professional should not be considered. 
To consider future earning capacity in 
the valuation of the professional corpora-
tion's goodwill would have the effect of 
double counting, as earning capacity is 
also utilized in determining an appropri-
ate alimony award. See, e.g., Olson v. 
Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1985). 
Sorensen, 769 P.2d at 829. We believe the 
court of appeals fell into the very trap it 
warned against Plaintiffs appraiser val-
ued defendant's goodwill and reputation 
based on defendant's future earning capaci-
ty, i.e., what would his practice produce in 
dollar amount during the next few years? 
The two cannot be separated; future earn-
ing capacity comes in large part from good-
will and reputation. Holbrook, 103 Wis.2d 
at 350, 309 N.W.2d at 354. The trial court, 
too, made the same error when it recog-
nized that it could not and should not place 
a value on "the human resource of the 
ability of each party to produce income" 
but then placed a $62,560 value on defen-
dant's goodwill and reputation: 
The Court refused to set a dollar fig-
ure on the human resource of the ability 
of each party to produce income which 
may have been acquired during the 
course of the marriage. The Court spe-
cifically finds that such a determination 
is too speculative in nature and no 
amount of accounting gymnastics can 
give to such a computation the degree of 
credibility such that this Court would 
feel justified in setting a dollar figure; 
however, said ability is taken into ac-
count by the Court in considering the 
question of support and alimony. 
The illogic and unfairness of treating 
defendant's reputation as a dentist as a 
marital asset and dividing its value is dem-
onstrated by the fact that during the mar-
riage the parties invested substantial sums 
in plaintiffs education, which created an 
intangible asset in the form of her in-
creased earning capacity. She received a 
master's degree and only needs to complete 
her dissertation to get her doctorate; yet 
that asset was not considered marital prop-
erty by the trial court. This disparate 
treatment is illustrated by In re Marriage 
of Hall, 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 
(1984). There, both husband and wife were 
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medical doctors. The husband worked in a 
clinic with two other doctors. His gross 
yearly earnings exceeded $52,000. The 
wife, a salaried professor at the University 
of Washington, earned $42,000 per year. 
She enjoyed a reputation as one of the top 
ten physicians in the nation in the field of 
pediatrics genetics. Numerous medical 
schools across the nation had offered her 
employment with salaries up to $60,000. 
103 Wash.2d at 236-37, 692 P.2d at 176. 
The trial court found, and the Supreme 
Court of Washington affirmed, that the 
husband had professional goodwill which 
was a marital asset to be divided. The 
wife was found to have no goodwill due to 
the fact that she was a salaried physician. 
103 Wash.2d at 242, 692 P.2d at 178. 
We cannot justify drawing a distinction 
between a party who holds an advanced 
degree that enables him or her to command 
a substantial salary and one who holds an 
advanced degree but has chosen to be self-
employed and has earned a good reputation 
for skill and competence. Several other 
courts and judges have noted the lack of 
any real difference between advanced de-
grees and the goodwill of a professional 
sole practitioner. The Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals in Holbrook v. Holbrook stated: 
We are not persuaded that the concept 
of professional goodwill as a divisible 
marital asset should be adopted in Wis-
consin. We are not obliged nor inclined 
to follow the twisted and illogical path 
that other jurisdictions have made in 
dealing with this concept in the context 
of divorce. 
The concept of professional goodwill 
evanesces when one attempts to distin-
guish it from future earning capacity. 
Although a professional business's good 
reputation, which is essentially what its 
goodwill consists of, is certainly a thing 
of value, we do not believe that it bes-
tows on those who have an ownership 
interest in the business, an actual, sepa-
rate property interest. The reputation of 
a law firm or some other professional 
business is valuable to its individual own-
ers to the extent that it assures contin-
ued substantial earnings in the future. 
It cannot be separately sold or pledged 
by the individual owners. The goodwill 
or reputation of such a business accrues 
to the benefit of the owners only through 
increased salary. 
. . . Although we recognize the factual 
distinction between a degreeholder and a 
partner or shareholder in a law firm, we 
think the similarities compel analogous 
treatment in a divorce setting. In both 
cases, the "assetf' involved is not salable 
and has computable value to the individu-
al only to the extent that it promises 
increased future earnings. 
103 Wis.2d at 350-51, 309 N.W.2d at 354-
55 (citation omitted). 
Similarly, Judge Ruland, in a special con-
curring opinion, In re Marriage of Nichols, 
43 Colo.App. 383, 386, 606 P.2d 1314, 1316 
(1979), approved the trial court's observa-
tion: "[T]he going concern value [goodwill] 
is peculiarly tied to the names and skills of 
the Petitioner [husband] The Respon-
dent will share in this income by way of 
maintenance, and to consider it in property 
settlement would allow her double consid-
eration of that value." Id. The Supreme 
Court of Kansas in Powell v. Powell, 231 
Kan. 456, 648 P.2d 218 (1982), reviewed 
cases from other jurisdictions that dealt 
with professional goodwill, noted the split 
of authority on the subject, and agreed 
with those jurisdictions that do not treat 
professional goodwill as a marital asset to 
be divided. 
B. Accounts Receivable and Payable 
[2] Defendant next contends that the 
accounts receivable of his dental practice 
should not have been included in the value 
of his practice because they represent de-
ferred income from which he must pay 
child support and alimony. He relies upon 
a statement in our opinion in Dogu v. 
Dogu, 652 P.2d 1308 (Utah 1982). There, 
we held that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion by awarding the defendant 
physician the entire interest in his profes-
sional corporation of which he was the sole 
shareholder. We stated that the corpora-
tion had accounts receivable that "repre-
sent deferred income" from which the de-
O-H 
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fendant "may meet his ongoing alimony 
and child support obligations," but did not 
indicate whether an offsetting amount was 
awarded to the plaintiff wife. Id. at 1309. 
We now disavow any implication that an 
accounts receivable cannot be valued and 
counted as an asset, even though the pro-
ceeds may be used as any other asset to 
pay future alimony or child support We 
find no error in the trial court's including 
the discounted value of the accounts receiv-
able as a marital asset 
[3] On the other side of the ledger of 
defendant's dental practice were $10,129 in 
accounts payable. Plaintiffs appraiser did 
not subtract that amount as a liability in 
arriving at his estimate of value. Instead, 
he factored in the accounts payable in de-
termining the value of the goodwill of the 
practice. Since we have determined in part 
IA of this opinion that no amount should 
have been included for goodwill and reputa-
tion, upon remand the trial court is directed 
to offset the accounts payable against the 
accounts receivable. 
II. EXPERT WITNESS FEES 
[4] At a pretrial conference before the 
divorce commissioner, the parties agreed to 
have their real property appraised by a 
mutually acceptable appraiser and stipu-
lated that defendant would pay the apprais-
er, but "[a] final determination of responsi-
bility for said expense [is] to be made by 
the court." Alan Heiskanen was chosen as 
the mutually acceptable appraiser, and he 
testified for plaintiff on the first day of 
trial. On the second day of trial, defendant 
called a different appraiser as his witness, 
apparently because defendant did not agree 
with Mr. Heiskanen's appraisal. The trial 
court ordered plaintiff and defendant to 
divide the fees of Mr. Heiskanen equally. 
The court of appeals affirmed that order, 
as we now do. Defendant relies upon 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 
1980), and Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 
(Utah 1980), as authority for the proposi-
tion that he could not be held liable for 
witness fees in excess of the statutory rate 
1. The statute now provides for $17 per day. See 
of $14 per day,1 as provided in Utah Code 
Ann. § 21-5-4. 
A short answer to this contention is that 
the parties' stipulation covered more than 
the payment of "witness fees." At the 
time the parties entered into the stipula-
tion, Mr. Heiskanen's appraisal had not yet 
been made and neither party knew whether 
he or she would use him as a witness. It 
appears to us that the intent of the parties 
was to obtain an appraisal which would 
provide helpful information to both parties, 
without regard to whether the appraiser 
would be called as a witness at the trial. 
The stipulation contemplated that the trial 
court would determine who should pay for 
the appraisal based on equitable consider-
ations without regard to the strictures of 
the statute and case law regarding "wit-
ness fees" for testifying in court. It may 
be true, as defendant points out, that part 
of Mr. Heiskanen's fee included his testify-
ing in court for plaintiff. However, there 
is nothing in the record breaking down his 
fee between his services in making the 
appraisal and his later services in testifying 
at trial for plaintiff. We find no abuse of 
discretion by the trial court in requiring the 
parties to equally share the payment of the 
fees. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES 
[5] Plaintiff contends that the court of 
appeals erred in reversing the trial court's 
award of $2,000 in attorney fees. The ba-
sis of the reversal was insufficiency of 
evidence as to the reasonableness of the 
fees. The resolution of this issue involves 
the interpretation of a stipulation between 
the parties and accepted by the trial judge 
on the first day of cnaL We interpret the 
exchange between the two lawyers and the 
judge as follows: Defendant's attorney re-
fused to stipulate to the reasonableness of 
the fee requested by plaintiff; however, he 
stipulated that if called as a witness, plain-
tiffs attorney would state what his fee was 
based on and would testify that the fee was 
reasonable. The trial judge then restated 
the stipulation as he understood i t 'The 
stipulation would not go to the question of 
Utah Code Ann. § 21-5-4 (1991). 
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whether or not they are reasonable or 
whether they should be awarded, but that 
reasonableness would be his testimony." 
Defendant did not adduce any evidence re-
garding the reasonableness of the fee re-
quested. Since we interpret the stipulation 
to be that plaintiffs attorney, if called, 
would testify that the requested fee was 
reasonable, we conclude that the evidence 
is sufficient to support the award of $2,000, 
one-half of the requested fee. The award 
to plaintiff is therefore reinstated. 
Plaintiff further complains that the court 
of appeals denied her attorney fees on ap-
peal. Because we resolve the main issue 
raised on appeal in favor of defendant, viz., 
the valuation of the dental practice, we find 
no abuse of discretion in the denial. For 
that reason, plaintiff is denied attorney 
fees on this certiorari review. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The part of the decree of divorce con-
cerning property division is reversed, and 
the case is remanded to the district court to 
make an equitable division in accordance 
with this decision and without regard to 
any value of goodwill or reputation of de-
fendant's dental practice. We affirm the 
division of appraiser fee's, reinstate the 
$2,000 award of attorney fees, and affirm 
the denial of attorney fees on appeal to the 
court of appeals. We also deny attorney 
fees on this review. 
HALL, CJ., concurs. 
STEWART, Justice (Concurring): 
I concur in the majority opinion except 
for the statement that the accounts payable 
should be offset against the accounts re-
ceivable. Whether the particular payables 
w ~*-~ „_ w*J3c« spends 
on the nature of each item. It may also be 
necessary to determine whether the partic-
ular accounts have been double-counted in 
determining defendant's income and the 
value of the marital estate, as could occur 
depending upon the nature of the account-
ing methods used. If one or another of the 
items has been taken into account for one 
such purpose, it should not be used a sec-
ond time. 
In my view, the treatment of those ac-
counts should be left to the trial judge. 
DURHAM, Justice (Dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent Defendant argues 
that the goodwill of a solo professional 
practice cannot be marital property. He 
cites Jackson v. Caldwell, 415 P.2d 667 
(Utah 1966), for the proposition that a pro-
fessional practice does not have any good-
will value. Stripped of dicta, that case 
stands for nothing more than that Jackson 
failed to prove that his former accounting 
partnership had any remaining goodwill for 
which it was accountable to him. See id. at 
671. In that case, we simply upheld the 
factual findings of the district court 
Defendant cites Dogu v. Dogu, 652 P.2d 
1308 (Utah 1982), as reaffirming his view 
of Jackson. Our decision in Dogu contains 
no analysis of this issue, only a simple 
statement, not referring to a trial court 
finding, that Dr. Dogu's medical practice 
had no "earning power" other than his 
ability to work. Id. at 1309. There is no 
mention of evidence about the value of the 
practice other than receivables and cash on 
hand, which were both accounted for in 
offsets and alimony. We certainly did not 
reject the concept of goodwill value in that 
case. 
Defendant asserts that language in 
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 
1988), noting that "[g]ood will is properly 
subject to equitable distribution upon di-
vorce," id. at 1080 n. 1, is dictum and that 
the facts of Gardner distinguish it any-
way. I do not agree. What appears to be 
dictum in Gardner is intended to guide the 
trial court on remand. Although the facts 
of Gardner are different (D~ r*nmm~—~ -vis 
part of the twenty-three-member Ogden 
Clinic, while defendant is a sole practition-
er), the distinctions do not make a differ-
ence here. 
The real problem, and apparently a major 
reason for the disagreement between the 
majority and the dissent in the court of 
appeals, lies with the term "goodwill." 
The majority below went to some trouble to 
explain why goodwill could be marital prop-
D-fc 
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erty subject to distribution, and the dissent 
took them to task for "trying to create 
'new property" in the context of marriage 
dissolution." Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 
P.2d 820, 833 (Utah CtApp.1989) (Jackson, 
J., dissenting). 
If the issue before us were whether a 
specific dollar figure assigned to the "good-
will" of defendant's practice as a separate 
asset in that practice was supported by the 
evidence at trial, we would be faced with a 
more difficult question. However, the trial 
court's factual finding was that the value 
of defendant's dental practice was $100,-
000. The court made a comprehensive 
finding on value and did not break that 
figure down into specific categories, such 
as accounts receivable, equipment, or good-
will. In its conclusions of law, the court 
stated its "feeling that the large portion of 
the value of the practice has to do with 
good will and reputation built up in the 
practice over the years of marriage." The 
court's finding and conclusion are sup-
ported by the evidence and are consistent 
with the testimony of plaintiffs expert on 
dental practice appraisals. 
No specific evidence was introduced by 
plaintiff on the value of "goodwill" as the 
parties use the term in their briefs.1 Good-
will was merely the term used by the trial 
court to define that significant part of the 
value of the practice not directly attribut-
able to accounts receivable and equipment 
and to allude to the reasoning behind its 
conclusion that eleven-sixteenths of the 
practice was marital property, as discussed 
hereafter. 
The trial court accepted plaintiffs ex-
pert's valuation of zhe dental practice. 
This expert relied on a method that valued 
the intangible aspects oi a practice by mul-
tiplying the annual gross receipts of the 
practice by a percentage factor (ranging 
from 20 to 100 percent) that took into ac-
count such variables as location of the 
1. Although plaintiff's attorney and expert used 
the word "goodwill" several times in the course 
of the testimony on the value of defendant's 
practice, that testimony and the appraisal report 
admitted into evidence make clear that the term 
actually referred generally to all intangible as-
pects of value, including those discussed below. 
practice, age of accounts receivable, ratio 
of accounts payable to gross revenues, age 
and condition of equipment, office atmo-
sphere, etc.2 The actual percent of gross 
revenues selected depended on these varia-
bles and was determined by the appraiser 
based on his experience and the informa-
tion compiled by the dental practice broker-
age firm to which plaintiffs expert be-
longed. 
Plaintiffs expert valued defendant's 
practice at 34 percent of its gross annual 
revenues, plus discounted accounts receiva-
ble and equipment value. On cross-exami-
nation, the expert testified that this method 
of valuation did not break down the value 
of the practice, even though accounts re-
ceivable and equipment were valued sepa-
rately. Plaintiffs expert testified that this 
was a standard method of valuing dental 
practices for sale and opined that most 
practices sold for more than 90 percent of 
appraised value. This method is not unlike 
methods commonly used to value other 
types of businesses and even commercial 
property. 
Credibility of witnesses and valuation of 
property are within the trial court's discre-
tion, which this court does not disturb un-
less it has been abused. See, e.g., Soren-
sen, 769 P.2d at 823. Defendant has not 
shown that the trial court abused its discre-
tion. The majority opinion errs in identify-
ing the issue in this case as an abstract one 
of whether the goodwill of a solo profes-
sional practice can be a marital asset 
Rather, the issue should merely be one of 
proof: Did the plaintiff in this case put on 
sufficient evidence to support a finding of 
value consistent with her theory? The an-
swer is yes. If a plaintiff, using admissible 
and reliable evidence, can convince a trial 
court that a solo professional practice has a 
specific value, then we should uphold that 
valuation, whether it includes goodwill or 
not If the plaintiffs lawyer does a good 
2. Most of these factors are not relevant to good-
will as the term is used in the parties' brief s and 
in our cases. See, e.g., Gardner, 748 P.2d at 
1080 n. 1. 
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job, the plaintiffs case will include good-
will whenever sufficient credible testimony 
can be adduced to support it. 
In other words, I would hold that busi-
ness and professional goodwill constitutes 
marital property to the extent that market 
data establishes a value for it indepen-
dent of the value of spousal earning ca-
pacity, spousal skills, and postmarital 
spousal labor. Such a rule should allay 
the concerns expressed in the majority 
opinion. The majority's blanket prohibition 
of any consideration of goodwill as divisible 
marital property in any circumstances is 
overkill. See Hanson v. Hanson, 738 
S.W.2d 429, 433-35 (Mo.1987). 
In this case, the record reflects extensive 
expert testimony at trial regarding the fact 
that there is an economic (salable) value to 
the goodwill in this practice. There are 
experts who specialize in the sale of solo 
professional practices. In fact, this prac-
tice was for sale at the time of the divorce, 
listed by defendant himself at a price that 
included value for goodwill. I think the 
majority has overstepped the proper func-
tion of this court in substituting its "opin-
ion" that solo practices cannot include val-
ue for goodwill in the narrow context of 
divorce, when such value is included for all 
other purposes and when such value was 
supported by expert testimony and the fac-
tual findings of the trial court 
I concur in all other portions of the ma-
jority opinion. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the 
dissenting opinion of DURHAM, J. 
EMMETT Utah 781 
781 (Utah 1992) 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
James Lloyd EMMETT, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No, 910077. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 7, 1992. 
Rehearing Denied July 7, 1992. 
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth 
District Court, Washington County, J. Phil-
lip Eves, J., of committing sodomy on his 
five-year-old son, and he appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Hall, CJ., held that (1) 
the failure to make a prompt ruling on the 
defendant's motion to dismiss at the close 
of the prosecution's case was reversible 
error; (2) the prosecutor's remark during 
closing argument that the defendant had a 
prior forgery conviction, that the victim of 
the forgery was defendant's sister, and 
that the defendant was, thus, someone who 
took advantage of his own family members 
was plain error; and (3) errors had oc-
curred during cross-examination although 
defendant could not be deemed harmless, 
when viewed in context of the other errors. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
Howe, Associate CJ., dissented with 
opinion in which Zimmerman, J., joined. 
1. Criminal Law <s=>752% 
Defendant was entitled to prompt rul-
ing on his motion to dismiss at close of 
prosecution's case. U.C.A.1953, 77-17-3. 
2. Criminal Law <3=>1048 
Defendant's failure to take exception 
when trial court reserved ruling on defen-
dant's motion to dismiss at close of prose-
cution's case did not waive claim that de-
fendant was denied prompt ruling; defen-
dant raised his motion in timely manner 
and gave trial court opportunity to rule on 
sufficiency of state's case and to create 
adequate record. U.C.A.1953, 77-17-3. -. 
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Karen C. MARTINEZ, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Jess M. MARTINEZ, Defendant 
and Petitioner. 
No. 880189, 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 16, 1991. 
Divorce action was brought. The Dis-
trict Court, Davis County, Rodney S. Page, 
J., divorced parties and awarded custody, 
child support and alimony and divided prop-
erty. The wife appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, 754 P.2d 69, affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, and remanded. Certiorari 
was granted. The Supreme Court, Stew-
art, J., held that Court of Appeals erred in 
fashioning remedy in divorce cases called 
equitable restitution which could be award-
ed in addition to alimony, child support, and 
property. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Zimmerman, J., filed a concurring and 
dissenting opinion. 
Durham, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
1. Divorce <3=>252.3(1) 
Court of Appeals erred in fashioning 
new remedy in divorce cases called "eq-
uitable restitution" which could be awarded 
in addition to alimony, child support, and 
property; concept oi equitable restitution 
was based on proposition that failed mar-
riage was a venture akin to commercial 
partnership in which spouses invest time 
and effort solely for remunerative activi-
ties but marriage is certainly not compara-
blr to commercial partnership although it is 
a i artnership in some respects, and award 
of equitable restitution would be extraordi-
narily speculative. 
See publication Words and Phrases for 
other judicial constructions and defini-
tions. 
£-1 
2. Divorce <S=>252.3(1) 
Supreme Court does not recognize 
property interest in personal characteristics 
of another person such as intelligence, 
skill, judgment, and temperament, however 
characterized, which can be divided upon 
divorce. 
3. Divorce <3=*237 
Alimony award should be determined 
by receiving spouse's earning capacity, fi-
nancial condition, and needs by ability of 
other spouse to provide support. 
4. Divorce <s=>237 
Usually needs of spouses, for purposes 
of determining alimony, are assessed in 
light of standard of living they had during 
marriage and in some circumstances it may 
be appropriate to try to equalize spouses' 
respective standards of living. 
5. Divorce <3=>237, 252.2 
When marriage of long duration dis-
solves on threshold of major change in 
income of one spouse due to collective ef-
forts of both, that change, unless unrelated 
to efforts put forward by spouses during 
marriage, should be given some weight in 
fashioning support award; thus, if one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced through efforts of both spouses 
during marriage, it may be appropriate for 
trial court to make compensating adjust-
ment in dividing marital property and 
awarding alimony. 
Kent M. Kasting, Kim M. Luhn, Salt 
Lake City, for Jess Martinez. 
Neil B. Crist, Nelda M. Bishop, Bounti-
ful, for Karen Martinez. 
STEWART, Justice: 
This case is here on a writ of certiorari to 
the Utah Court of Appeals to review the 
single issue of whether that court erred in 
fashioning a new remedy in divorce cases 
which it called equitable restitution and 
which may be awarded in addition to alimo-
ny, child support, and property. See Mar-
tinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct 
App.1988). 
I. FACTS 
Karen and Jess Martinez were married in 
1968, while Mr. Martinez was serving in 
the United States Army. Both had high 
school educations. Mr. Martinez began his 
college education in 1970. Three children 
were born to the marriage between 1970 
and 1975. While an undergraduate stu-
dent, Mr. Martinez decided to attend medi-
cal school, a decision Mrs. Martinez did not 
agree with because she thought that medi-
cal school would be financially draining and 
would limit her husband's ability to spend 
time with the family. Nevertheless, Mr. 
Martinez entered medical school in 1977 
and graduated in 1981. He obtained finan-
cial support for his education primarily 
from his own earnings, student loans, the 
G.I. Bill, and a bequest from his mother's 
estate. Mrs. Martinez did not contribute 
financially to her husband's medical edu-
cation. 
Karen Martinez filed a complaint for di-
vorce in 1983, and a decree of divorce was 
entered in 1985. The trial court found that 
Dr. Martinez's gross annual income as a 
resident was $100,000 and that "[djuring 
fourteen years that the parties lived to-
gether, [Mrs. Martinez] assisted extensive-
ly in [Dr. Martinez's] obtaining a college 
education, medical degree and internship. 
In addition, [she] made substantial sacri-
fices in order to facilitate the completion of 
[his] medical schooling and internship." 
Mrs. Martinez also earned a very minor 
amount of income for a short period which 
was used for family expenses. 
The trial court awarded Mrs. Martinez 
the house the couple had acquired during 
the marriage and required her to make the 
Dr. Martinez was awarded a lien on that 
property in the amount of $17,678, which 
represented half the equity in the home. 
The court also awarded Mrs. Martinez child 
support of $300 per month per child, and 
$400 per month alimony for a period of five 
years, with the condition that the alimony 
terminate after three years if she remar-
ried. Dr. Martinez was ordered to provide 
health, accident, and dental insurance for 
the children and to maintain a life insur-
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ance policy on himself for the benefit of the 
children. He was also awarded the federal 
tax exemptions for two of the children. 
The personal property acquired during the 
marriage was divided equally. Debts in 
the amount of approximately $19,000 for 
student loans were assigned to Dr. Mar-
tinez. Finally, the court awarded Mrs. 
Martinez attorney fees in the amount of 
$2,500. The trial court ruled that Dr. Mar-
tinez's medical degree and training were 
not a marital asset subject to distribution, 
but considered his right to practice medi-
cine as it affected his income and ability to 
pay alimony and child support. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Mrs. 
Martinez contended, inter alia, that the 
child support, alimony, and attorney fees 
awarded by the trial court were so inade-
quate as to constitute an abuse of discre-
tion and that the tax exemptions should not 
have been awarded to Dr. Martinez. That 
court awarded the tax exemptions to Mrs. 
Martinez, increased the child support 
award to $600 per month per child, and 
awarded permanent alimony of $750 per 
month. The court affirmed the trial 
court's award of only a portion of Mrs. 
Martinez's attorney fees. Martinez v. 
Martinez, 754 P.2d 69, 72-75 (Utah CtApp. 
1988). Relying on its own prior decisions, 
the Court of Appeals also held that Dr. 
Martinez's medical degree was not marital 
property subject to division. See Martinez, 
754 P.2d at 75-76; see also Rayburn v. 
Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238 (Utah Ct.App.1987); 
Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah 
CtApp.1987). 
The court concluded, however, that a 
means should be devised to compensate 
Mr? Martinez for the contribution she had 
made to the family. The court stated that 
Mrs. Martinez "has earned an award of 
some permanent financial benefit, in her 
own right, that will allow her to share in 
the economic benefits achieved through 
their joint efforts" and that Dr. Martinez's 
earning capacity "must be recognized in 
fashioning those 'legal and equitable reme-
dies' necessary to assist plaintiff to read-
just her life." 754 P.2d at 75, 76. Accord-
ingly, the court created a new type of prop-
B'2. 
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erty interest which it called "equitable res-
titution/' to be awarded Mrs. Martinez in 
addition to her interest in the home, alimo-
ny, and child support.1 Judge Jackson, in 
dissent, concluded that although Mrs. Mar-
tinez was entitled to a "generous but fair 
distribution of property and award of ali-
mony," the concept of "equitable restitu-
tion" was not supportable. 754 P.2d at 82 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). 
The Court of Appeals listed five factors 
for trial courts to consider in determining 
when an award of "equitable restitution" 
should be made. Those factors are (1) the 
length of the marriage, (2) financial contri-
butions and personal development sacri-
fices made by the spouse requesting eq-
uitable restitution, (3) the duration of the 
contributions and sacrifices during the 
marriage, (4) the disparity in earning capac-
ity between the spouses, and (5) the 
amount of property accumulated during 
the marriage. 754 P.2d at 78. Although 
the court failed to indicate what weight 
those factors should be accorded or just 
how equitable restitution should be com-
puted, it remanded the case to the trial 
court to determine what the amount of 
equitable restitution should be. 
Dr. Martinez filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari to this Court. We granted the 
petition solely on the issue of whether the 
Court of Appeals erred in devising "eq-
uitable restitution" as a new form of prop-
erty in divorce cases. 
[1] Mrs. Martinez argues that the con-
cept of equitable restitution is justified on 
the ground that the remedies available un-
der current law for the distribution of prop-
erty and the support of a former spouse 
are inadequate to provide a fair and eq-
uitable result. She contends, in essence, 
that a new form of property must be recog-
nized by the courts to provide for a just 
and equitable distribution of the increased 
earning power which one spouse realizes 
1. The Court of Appeals purported to rely on this 
Court's opinion in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 
1076 (Utah 1988), as the starting point to devise 
the property interest it called "equitable restitu-
tion." In Gardner, this Court sidestepped the 
issue of whether an advanced degree could be 
valued as a marital asset and made subject to 
from an advanced education acquired dur-
ing the marriage. The "investment'' re-
ferred to by Mrs. Martinez is whatever 
effort, support, and sacrifice that is made 
by the nonadvantaged spouse. (Herein-
after, we refer to the spouse receiving the 
education as the advantaged spouse and 
the other spouse as the nonadvantaged 
spouse.) 
The increased earning capacity of the 
advantaged spouse is, according to Mrs. 
Martinez, "human capital/' which she mea-
sures by the discounted present value of 
the projected increased future earnings of 
the advantaged spouse during the working 
life of that spouse. Mrs. Martinez urges 
us to hold that the nonadvantaged spouse 
is entitled to financial "reimbursement" for 
whatever efforts were made in assisting 
the advantaged spouse to obtain an ad-
vanced degree, even when wholly nonfinan-
cial. She candidly admits that the purpose 
of characterizing that interest as a proper-
ty interest is to make it a nonterminable 
interest, unlike alimony, which ordinarily 
terminates upon remarriage. In other 
words, the nonadvantaged spouse, even 
one who remarries, should benefit for life 
by sharing in his or her former spouse's 
increased earning capacity. 
The Court of Appeals' concept of eq-
uitable restitution cannot be sustained for 
three reasons. First, the concept of eq-
uitable restitution is based on the proposi-
tion that a failed marriage is a venture akin 
to a commercial partnership in which the 
spouses invest their time and effort solely 
for remunerative activities. Although mar-
riage is a partnership in some respects, a 
marriage is certainly not comparable to a 
commercial pannersmp. The efforts each 
spouse makes for the other and for their 
common marital interests cannot be quanti-
fied in monetary terms, their respective 
contributions netted out, and a balance 
struck at the termination of a marriage. 
distribution in a property award. We observed 
that there were sufficient marital assets in that 
case to distinguish it "from others in which 
equity and fairness required another solution." 
748 P.2d at 1081. That statement, however, did 
not contemplate any such thing as "equitable 
restitution." 
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The very idea of marriage contemplates 
mutual effort and mutual sacrifice. Yet, in 
this case, Mrs. Martinez would value only 
ker contribution to the marriage and not 
his. In any event, the spouses' contribu-
tions cannot be reduced to a common de-
nominator that allows for a valid compari-
5on in monetary terms. Indeed, the very 
attempt to do so would interfere with the 
trial court's ability to achieve an equitable 
result based on the needs of the spouses in 
light of the monetary resources available. 
For example, if a spouse avoids his or her 
marital responsibilities, the partnership the-
ory might result in denying that spouse 
any award of support or property at di-
vorce, irrespective of his or her need and 
the other spouse's ability to pay. That is 
not the law. 
Second, an award of equitable restitution 
would be extraordinarily speculative. Al-
though the Court of Appeals' opinion is 
somewhat unclear as to what kind of eco-
nomic interest it intended to create or just 
how it should be computed, it did state, 
44An award of equitable restitution will not 
terminate upon plaintiff's remarriage, and 
may be payable in lump sum or periodically 
over time depending on the circumstances 
of each case." 754 P.2d at 78-79. Clearly, 
the Court of Appeals contemplated a sub-
stantial award.2 Mrs. Martinez asserts 
that equitable restitution should be based 
on the discounted value of Dr. Martinez's 
earnings as a physician over his remaining 
working life to age 65, less the amount a 
high school graduate would have earned 
over the same time. Based on those calcu-
lations, Mrs. Martinez values Dr. Mar-
tinez's medical education at $1,555,000.3 
Although the Court of Appeals did not 
specific!!!v adotjt tb's formula for calculat-
2. The Court of Appeals stated that on remand 
the trial court might, for example, extinguish 
Dr. Martinez's lien on the family home and 
credit that amount against the overall award of 
equitable restitution. The court stated that this 
amount, $17,528, "would probably be only a 
fraction of the total amount of equitable restitu-
tion awarded." 754 P.2d at 79 n. 12. 
3. Dr. W. Chris Lewis was the expert used by 
Mrs. Martinez to place a value on the increased 
"income stream" that Dr. Martinez would have 
for the remainder of his career. Dr. Lewis had 
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ing the amount of equitable restitution, 
neither did it reject it or refer to any for-
mula by which the amount of equitable 
restitution could be calculated. In any 
event, any formula which accomplished 
that court's purpose would necessarily be 
inherently and highly speculative. If, for 
example, a court awarded a lump-sum pay-
ment, the award would be based upon a 
wholly false assumption if the payor 
spouse's working life were cut short by 
death, illness, change of profession, or ear-
ly retirement or if the working life were 
interrupted for any other reason. Further-
more, whether a court awarded a lump sum 
or periodic payments, the receiving spouse 
would be given what is tantamount to a 
lifetime estate in the paying spouse's earn-
ings that have no necessary relationship to 
the receiving spouse's actual contribution 
to the enhanced earning power or to that 
spouse's needs, however broadly defined. 
Third, although the Court of Appeals 
stated that it rejected the proposition that 
Dr. Martinez's medical degree should be 
valued as a property interest and Mrs. Mar-
tinez given an interest in it, that court's 
concept of equitable restitution is essential-
ly indistinguishable. 
[2] The recipient of an advanced degree 
obtains that degree on the basis of his or 
her innate personal talents, capabilities, 
and acquired skills and knowledge. Such a 
degree is highly personal to the recipient 
and has none of the traditional characteris-
tics of property. "It does not have an 
exchange value or any objective transfer-
able value on an open market. It is person-
al to the holder. It terminates on death of 
the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot 
be assiened, sold, transferred, conveved, or 
not previously valued a medical degree or medi-
cal practice. He calculated the present value of 
the lifetime earnings of a healthy 38-year-old 
currently earning J 100,000 per year to be 
$2,482,500. He then deducted what he thought 
an average high school graduate would earn 
over the same period of time, or $926,000, and 
concluded that the value of Dr. Martinez's 
"medical education and training" based on his 
increased earning capacity was $1,555,000. On 
the basis of that amount, Mrs. Martinez would 
be awarded a substantial sum. 
k'H 
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pledged." In re Marriage of Graham, 194 
Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). The 
time has long since passed when a person's 
personal attributes and talents were 
thought to be subject to monetary valua-
tion for commercial purposes. In short, we 
do not recognize a property interest in per-
sonal characteristics of another person 
such as intelligence, skill, judgment, and 
temperament, however characterized. 
The law accepted in other jurisdictions 
almost unanimously is that professional de-
grees are not marital property and are not 
subject to equitable distribution. Of twen-
ty-four jurisdictions that have considered 
the issue, all but two have held that a 
professional degree or license is not marital 
property subject to equitable distribution. 
See Archer v. Archer, 303 Md. 347, 493 
A.2d 1074, 1077 (1985); see also, In re 
Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 
P.2d 75 (1978); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 
677 P.2d 814 (Wyo.1984). See generally 
Annotation, Spouse's Professional Degree 
or License as Marital Property for Pur-
poses of Alimony, Support, or Property 
Settlement, 4 A.L.R.4th 1294 (1981 & 
Supp.1990).4 See contra O'Brien v. 
O'Brien, 114 Misc.2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 
(N.Y.Sup.Ct.1982), affd as modified, 66 
N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 
743 (1985) (holding that a professional de-
gree is a marital asset based on a New 
York statute unlike Utah's). 
[3] Mrs. Martinez's contention that the 
remedies provided by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-5 are insufficient is without merit. 
Those remedies are adequate to fashion an 
appropriate award that meets the stan-
dards to be applied in determining awards 
of alimony. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 P.2d 96, 
100-01 (Utah 1986); Jones v. Jones, 700 
P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). 
An alimony award should be determined by 
the receiving spouse's earning capacity, fi-
nancial condition, and needs and by the 
4. See also Albert, Dissolution of Marriage When 
One Spouse Holds A Professional Degree—A Call 
to Fairness, 36 Drake L.Rev. 1, 3-9 (1986-87) 
(explaining why courts should not treat profes-
sional degrees as marital property); Comment, 
ability of the other spouse to provide sup. 
port. See Jones. 700 P.2d at 1075. 
[4,5] Usually the needs of the spouses 
are assessed in light of the standard of 
living they had during marriage. Gardner 
v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 
1988); Jones, 700 P.2d at 1075. In some 
circumstances, it may be appropriate to try 
to equalize the spouses' respective stan-
dards of living. Gardner, 748 P.2d at 
1081; see also Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 
564, 566 (Utah 1985); Higley v. Higley, 676 
P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983). When a mar-
riage of long duration dissolves on the 
threshold of a major change in the income 
of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change, unless un-
related to the efforts put forward by the 
spouses during marriage, should be given 
some weight in fashioning the support 
award. Cf Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 
1201, 1205 (Utah 1983). Thus, if one 
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly 
enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, it may be 
appropriate for the trial court to make a 
compensating adjustment in dividing the 
marital property and awarding alimony. 
See, e.g., Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 
1980); Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah 
483, 211 P.2d 452 (1949). 
Here, the trial court found that the par-
ties would have enjoyed a higher family 
income because of Dr. Martinez's increased 
income, which was due to some extent to 
the efforts of both spouses during the mar-
riage. Although Dr. Martinez earned 
$100,000 a year before the parties divorced, 
Mrs. Martinez had not enjoyed a higher 
standard of living as a result of that in-
creased income. The trial e~ -* awarded 
Mrs. Martinez alimony in the amount of 
$400 per month for a period of five years. 
That amount was nonterminable for a peri-
od of three years even if Mrs. Martinez 
remarried. The Court of Appeals, relying 
upon Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 
1985), modified that award by increasing it 
Property Distribution in Domestic Relations Law: 
A Proposal for Excluding Educational Degrees 
and Professional Licenses From the Marital Es-
tate, 11 Hofstra L.Rev. 1327, 1327-29 (1983). 
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to $750 per month subject to the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1987), which 
provides for the termination of a perma-
nent alimony award in certain circum-
stances* That and other modifications 
made by the Court of Appeals in favor of 
Mrs. Martinez have not been challenged by 
either party in this Court. 
We granted certiorari solely on the issue 
of equitable restitution and denied certiora-
ri on all other issues. We therefore ex-
press no opinion on the appropriateness of 
the other modifications made by the Court 
of Appeals in the divorce decree. 
The Court of Appeals' direction to the 
trial court to devise an award of equitable 
restitution is reversed, and the case is re-
manded to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings in light of this opinion and the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals. 
HALL, C.J., and HOWE, Associate CJ., 
concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring and 
dissenting): 
I join Justice Stewart's opinion in its 
rejection of the equitable restitution doc-
trine created by the court of appeals. As 
he states, the trial court has ample power 
to make alimony and property division 
awards which will ensure that equity is 
done to a spouse who is denied an increase 
in standard of living because a divorce oc-
curs on the threshold of an event that is 
economically advantageous to the other 
spouse. There is no reason to create a new 
and conceptually ill-defined property con-
cept to meet this need. 
Justice Durham's dissent deserves some 
comment. She suggests that we should 
affirm the court of appeals' adoption of an 
equitable restitution doctrine because our 
existing case law on property division and 
alimony is insufficiently flexible to allow 
for the fashioning of a remedy for situa-
tions of the type presented here. She then 
suggests that if we are going to rely upon 
property division and alimony law to deal 
with these problems, we need to articulate 
guidelines for the trial courts in dealing 
^ th this area. 
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I disagree with Justice Durham's prem-
ise that our cases do not permit the use of 
alimony and property division to produce a 
fair result in these cases. It may be that 
our prior cases have not addressed the 
issue, but the opinion Justice Stewart has 
authored today does. The majority specifi-
cally states: 
When a marriage of long duration dis-
solves on the threshold of a major 
change in the income of one of the spous-
es due to the collective efforts of both, 
that change, unless unrelated to the ef-
forts put forward by the spouses during 
marriage, should be given some weight 
in fashioning the support award. 
At 542. 
The majority opinion also makes it clear 
that the trial court can make such compen-
sating adjustments to both the property 
division and the alimony award as it deems 
necessary to make the ultimate decision 
equitable: 
[I]f one spouse's earning capacity has 
been greatly enhanced through the ef-
forts of both spouses during the mar-
riage, it may be appropriate for the trial 
court to make a compensating adjust-
ment in dividing the marital property and 
awarding alimony. 
At 542. 
In light of this language, joined in by 
four members of the court, there can be no 
doubt that trial judges are empowered and 
enjoined to take circumstances like those 
presented here into account in making ali-
mony and property division awards. To 
the extent that Justice Durham's opinion 
suggests the contrary, it misstates the-law. 
As for what appears to be Justice Dur-
ham's larger concern—that we have given 
the trial courts insufficient guidance as to 
how to make the required adjustments in 
awards—I agree that over time, we will 
have to give further shape to the rules 
governing the division of property and the 
award of alimony to be sure that both 
parties in cases like this one are dealt with 
fairly. However, there seems little need to 
opt for one theoretical framework now. In 
this area, law development on a case-by-
case basis may be the best approach. -
£•4 
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On a separate issue, I dissent from the 
majority's remand of this matter to the 
trial court. The court of appeals found 
that the trial court abused its discretion 
and attempted to modify the decree to 
make it sufficiently equitable to pass appel-
late muster. In doing so, the court of 
appeals modified the alimony award and 
the child support award and ordered eq-
uitable restitution. We granted certiorari 
to consider only the equitable restitution 
portion of that modification of the divorce 
decree, and we have now said that in mak-
ing that specific modification, the court of 
appeals overreached. We have not said 
that the decree was equitable without some 
adjustment that would address the problem 
which motivated the creation of the eq-
uitable restitution doctrine. We have only 
said that the equitable result sought by the 
court of appeals cannot be achieved that 
way. In fact, the opinion of Justice Stew-
art recognizes that the trial court had the 
power to effect a remedy for the underly-
ing problem. 
Under these circumstances, we should 
remand the matter to the court of appeals 
for further proceedings. It should be al-
lowed to again address the propriety of the 
trial court's decree in light of our explica-
tion of the law. There is no occasion for us 
to send this matter back to the trial court. 
If the court of appeals thinks it needs more 
information from the trial court, there will 
be time enough for such a remand. 
DURHAM, Justice dissenting: 
The majority opinion holds that profes-
sional degrees are not marital properly and 
rejects the principle of equitable restitution 
fashioned bv the court of appeals, on th* 
cneory that currently recognized rights to 
alimony, child support, and property distri-
bution are sufficient to solve the complex 
problems posed by cases like this. I dis-
agree and would argue that if we are going 
to prohibit the use of the principles relied 
on by the court of appeals, then we must 
fashion a new and more flexible theory of 
alimony. 
First, there is insufficient tangible prop-
erty to compensate the spouse who has 
been "investing" time, labor, earnings, and 
postponed improvements in standard of liv-
ing for the long-term benefit of the marital 
community when the marriage ends before 
the investment has "paid off." Second, 
child support protects the rights of the 
children of divorcing spouses to share m 
present and future benefits of earning ca-
pacity; it may not legitimately be used to 
compensate a former spouse for the value 
of what she has "invested" without return 
(or lost) as a result of the termmation of 
the marriage. Finally, alimony as current-
ly understood in our law is theoretically 
inadequate to perform the compensation 
function that the court of appeals identified 
as necessary in this case. One need only 
examine the alimony decisions cited by the 
majority opinion to ascertain that alimony 
in this state has depended on (1) the finan-
cial conditions and needs of the recipient 
spouse, (2) the ability of the recipient 
spouse to produce sufficient income for 
self-support, and (3) the ability of the payor 
spouse to provide support. See, e.g., Jones 
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985). 
To those fundamental principles, we have 
added the consideration that "[a]n alimony 
award should, in as far as possible, equal-
ize the parties' respective standards of liv-
ing and maintain them at a level as close as 
possible to the standard of living enjoyed 
during the marriage" Higley v. Higley, 
676 P.2d 379, 381 (Utah 1983) (emphasis 
added). 
I submit that none of the foregoing prin-
ciples address the specific problem posed 
by termination of a marriage in which one 
or both spouses have sacrificed in tangible 
and intangible ways, foregoing income, ac-
cumulation of property, an enhanced stan-
Ju^J o^  .I'iiis, c ^ che educational and ca-
reer-development opportunities of one so 
that the other might acquire a valuable and 
prestigious professional degree. When the 
marriage ends before the marital communi-
ty has enjoyed the benefits expected from 
that sacrifice, the nonholder of the degree 
suffers a very real loss. Whether we 
adopt a doctrine of "equitable restitution" 
or rethink the theory and function of alimo-
ny, we must address the requirements of 
equity and justice to compensate in some 
MARTINEZ i 
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fashion for that loss. As David S. Dolow-
jtz recently noted in the Utah Bar Jour-
nal equitable restitution is a form of ali-
mony "paid to produce an equitable bal-
ancing of property and income that cannot 
be otherwise effected" by the traditional 
forms of support alimony and rehabilitative 
alimony. Dolowitz, The Impact of Tax 
laws on Divorce, Utah B.J., at 8, 9 (Au-
gust/September 1991) (emphasis added). 
Other commentators have recently devot-
ed a great deal of scholarly attention to the 
problems of compensating spouses for loss-
es they suffer because of decisions to fur-
ther the marital enterprise by enhancing 
the education or career of one spouse at 
cost to both.1 In a recent article discussing 
the question Should "The Theory of Ali-
mony" Include Nonfinancial Losses and 
Motivations?, 1991 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 259, law 
professor Ira Ellman (author of The Theo-
ry of Alimony, 77 Calif.L.Rev. 1 (1989)) 
observes: 
[Fjhe purpose of alimony under "The 
Theory" is to eliminate the financial di-
sincentives for marital sharing behavior 
that would be present in the absence of a 
remedy, rather than to provide positive 
incentives The principle is actually 
rather modest in scope. The policy upon 
which it is based would seem, at least at 
first, to be broadly acceptable: spouses 
otherwise inclined to conduct themselves 
during the marriage in a manner that 
benefits the marital community ought 
not be discouraged from acting that way 
for fear that, if the marriage were to 
dissolve, they would be left with all of 
the financial loss arising from their deci-
sion. This is especially true when, for 
example, the wife has a loss while her 
husband has no loss, or even reaps a gain 
(as would be the case where the wife 
gives up her employment to advance her 
husband's). 
B.Y.U.L.Rev. at 265. 
This approach is connected to an assess-
ment of loss, not one of need, as has tradi-
tionally been the case in the theory of 
1- See Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equi-
ty in "Enhanced Spouse/Other Spouse"Divorces, 
63 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 751 (1988); Shelburn & Chas-
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alimony. It requires the courts to discover 
or create means by which a spouse may 
recover after divorce the value of what he 
or she lost by reason of investment in the 
marital enterprise, where that investment 
has resulted in a net gain to the other 
spouse. 
Once the spouses' gain or loss from 
the marriage has been measured, they 
can be compared against one another to 
determine if one spouse has a loss that 
should be reallocated to the other. 
Clearly all losses cannot be compensable, 
for the simple reason that the claim is 
against the other spouse, and both spous-
es may have suffered a loss from their 
marriage. A loss is compensable, in 
whole or part, only if the other spouse's 
loss is smaller, or if the other spouse has 
achieved a gain. 
Id. at 271. Professor Ellman goes on to 
describe this as a "reliance measure" of 
loss, as opposed to the traditional contract 
damage measure of expectation, and ex-
plains its justification at some length. He 
also suggests several important limitations 
on his theory of alimony: for example, (1) 
only residual post-marriage losses are com-
pensable, not inequities in the exchange 
during marriage; (2) only financial losses 
are compensable; and (3) only losses aris-
ing from marital "sharing behavior" are 
compensable. 
I do not propose that we adopt Professor 
Ellman's theory wholesale; I only cite it as 
one example of a thoughtful effort to solve 
the problems posed by the common circum-
stances illustrated in this case. My criti-
cism of the majority opinion is that it 
makes no effort to guide the trial courts in 
fashioning a realistic remedy for what is a 
realistic loss. It rejects the effort of the 
court of appeals to do precisely that and 
offers no alternative. The legal status quo 
is unacceptable, in my view, and I hope 
that the majority will be willing in the 
future to make good on its representation 
that the concept of alimony (or property 
distribution when there is any property) 
can be accommodated to the need for equi-
tain, Career Assets and the Equitable Apportion-
ment of Marital Property, 38 S.C. L.Rev. 755 
(1987). 
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ty. Unless and until that happens, any 
woman (or man, for that matter) who sacri-
fices her own education, earning capacity, 
or career development so that a spouse 
may advance and the marriage may pros-
per as a joint venture will inevitably suffer 
the full cost of that decision at divorce, 
while the advantaged spouse will continue 
to walk away from the marriage with all of 
the major financial gain. That is unfair, 
and in this area at least, the responsibility 
of the law is to seek fairness. 
Raymond P.L. CANNEFAX and 
Debra Cannefax, Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
v. 
Donald W. CLEMENT and Ruth 
Lu Clement, Defendants and 
Petitioners, 
No. 900084. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 30, 1991. 
Purchasers who had acquired property 
from contract vendee brought quiet title 
action against contract vendors' creditors. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Pat B. Brian, J., rendered summary judg-
ment in favor of creditors and purchasers 
appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed 
with direction, 786 P.2d 1377. On certiorari, 
the Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that 
vendors' interest in property subject to ex-
ecutory real estate contract was not "real 
property" for purposes of judgment lien 
statute. 
Affirmed. 
1. Judgment <3=>780(3) 
Vendors' interest in property subject 
to executory real estate contract was not 
"real property" for purposes of judgment 
lien statute and, thus, judgment docketed 
against vendors after contract was entered 
into did not create lien against vendors' 
interest m property. U.C.A.1953, 78-22-1. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Judgment e=793(l) 
Judgment lien which has already at-
tached to real property will not be de-
stroyed by subsequent conveyance of prop-
erty. 
Rodney M. Pipella, Valden P. Livingston, 
Salt Lake City, for Raymond P.L. and De-
bra Cannefax. 
Steven H. Lybbert, Salt Lake City, for 
Donald and Ruth Clement. 
Michael W. Homer, David R. Olsen, Salt 
Lake City, for amicus Utah Land Title 
Ass'n. 
STEWART, Justice: 
This case is here on certiorari from a 
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
which reversed a summary judgment en-
tered by the trial court in favor of Donald 
and Ruth Clement Donald and Ruth 
Clement are judgment creditors of George 
and Lila Barker, vendors of land under a 
uniform real estate contract. The issue 
before the Court is one of first impression: 
whether a vendor's interest in real property 
sold by a land sale contract is transformed 
by the doctrine of equitable conversion into 
personal property and therefore not subject 
to a judgment lien pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-22-1 (1987). We hold that a 
judgment against the vendor of land under 
a land sale contract does not create a lien 
against a vendor's interest for purposes of 
§ 78-22-1. 
On August 28, 1981, pursuant to a uni-
form real estate contract, George and Lila 
Barker contracted to sell certain real prop-
erty which they owned in fee simple to 
Diane Hodge. Ms. Hodge recorded notice 
of that contract on August 31, 1981. The 
defendants, Donald W. Clement and Ruth 
